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The Migrant Protection Protocols: A
Death Knell for Asylum
Emily J. Johanson*
The federal government has slowly chipped away at U.S. asylum protections over the
past several decades. Moves to expand the detention and criminalization of asylum seekers in
an effort to deter asylum seekers’ entry into the United States have been denounced as
violations of U.S. obligations under domestic and international law.1 Yet, in 2018, the
Trump administration announced the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), an unprecedented
policy that sends asylum seekers back to Mexico to await their U.S. immigration court
hearings. The MPP presents unique challenges to the due process and nonrefoulement tenets
of our asylum system and has raised urgent concerns about the devolving role of the United
States as a place of refuge for those in danger. As a result of the MPP, border immigration
courts are even more overloaded than before, leading to abbreviated hearings and less process.
Moreover, because the MPP forces asylum seekers to wait in Mexico for their court hearing,
it is almost impossible for them to find an immigration attorney, let alone meaningfully
collaborate with their advocate in developing the case. Since the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic in March 2020, the asylum seekers subject to the MPP face even more severe health
and safety risks as they wait in dangerous camps along the border without plumbing or
sanitation. The implementation of this policy has ensured that many immigrants pursuing
asylum claims will not receive the process they are due under the law and must instead risk
persecution. Overall, the MPP is another alarming step the U.S. government has taken

* J.D., University of California, Irvine School of Law, 2020. I am grateful to my mentors at the ACLU
of San Diego and Imperial Counties, including Jonathan Markovitz, Monika Langarica, and Bardis
Vakili, who included me in early strategy meetings about the MPP in preparation for filing Doe v. Wolf,
and whose expertise helped me to parse through the policy landscape at the U.S.-Mexico border. Many
thanks to the staff, volunteers, and clients of Al Otro Lado and Espacio Migrante, especially Nicole
Ramos, Sue Chang, and Tania García Barajas, whose work and lived experience revealed the human
toll of the MPP. I am also grateful to Professor Jennifer L. Koh for helpful comments and insights into
how the MPP operates alongside other harmful asylum policies. Thanks to Saikrishna Upadhyayula for
reading and editing early drafts. My utmost gratitude and admiration for the tireless editors at the UC
Irvine Law Review, especially Sumouni Basu and Catherine Rosoff, who polished this piece with patience
and tenacity. Finally, I am fortunate to have begun my investigation of the MPP under the supervision
of Professor Annie Lai, whose teaching, guidance, and encouragement made this Note possible.
1. See, e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 844 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(“The rule barring asylum for immigrants who enter the country outside a port of entry irreconcilably
conflicts with the INA and the expressed intent of Congress.”).
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towards the dehumanization and brutalization of those who have fled to the United States
seeking protection.
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INTRODUCTION
On a typical Saturday morning in Tijuana, Mexico, Al Otro Lado’s2 client
consultation room is dotted with a dozen plastic tables. A long line of
families—mostly from Central America—seeking asylum in the United States but
currently subject to the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP)3 wait outside to check
in for their appointments at Al Otro Lado’s pro se legal clinic. During the
appointment, asylum seekers spend hours working with volunteer attorneys and law
students to complete an application for asylum. Prior to the MPP, many immigrant
families already lacked access to counsel due to the dearth of free or low-cost
immigration attorneys in the United States.4 Under the MPP, families who have
requested asylum from inside the United States or at a port of entry are sent back

2. Al Otro Lado is a social justice legal services organization serving indigent deportees,
migrants, and refugees in Tijuana, Mexico, and throughout Southern California. Our Story, AL OTRO
LADO,
https://alotrolado.org/who-we-are/
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20201030041600/
https://alotrolado.org/who-we-are/ ] ( last visited Nov. 11, 2020 ).
3. The Migrant Protection Protocols is the name the Trump administration gave to its policy.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen Announces Historic
Action to Confront Illegal Immigration (Dec. 20, 2018) [ hereinafter Nielsen Press Release ], https://
www.dhs.gov/news/2018/12/20/secretary-nielsen-announces-historic-action-confront-illegal-immigration
[ https://perma.cc/ZB44-VWL9 ]. But commentators and advocates have rebuked this euphemistic
name in light of the copious documentation of the harm those subject to the MPP face. See, e.g.,
HUM. RTS. FIRST, A SORDID SCHEME: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S ILLEGAL RETURN OF
ASYLUM SEEKERS TO MEXICO 1 (2019) (“On January 29, 2019, the Trump Administration began
implementing its perversely dubbed ‘Migration Protection Protocols.’ In reality, this policy is about
denying—not providing—protection to refugees, and is not a ‘protocol,’ but an attempt to circumvent
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and the laws passed by Congress.”). I use the official
title in this Note not as an endorsement of the name’s implicit suggestion but because it is the clearest
way to identify the policy.
4. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5, 75 (2015) (noting that during the time period investigated in this study,
sixty-three percent of all immigrants appeared in court without an attorney).
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to Mexico while their asylum claim is pending.5 They are only allowed back into the
United States for the duration of their hearing and are then returned to Mexico if
the hearing does not result in a final decision or is postponed.6 It is almost
impossible for those who are stuck in Mexico subject to the MPP to access critical
legal services from American immigration attorneys.7 Most attendees at the pro se
clinic will not receive subsequent legal representation and will likely remain stranded
in Mexico for months until the day they must return to the designated port of
entry—as early as 3:00 a.m.—to be transported to a border immigration court and
submit their asylum application at a scheduled hearing.8
Families from Central America subject to the MPP rarely have contacts or
support networks in Mexico, and the Mexican government does not have a
systematic way of providing for the basic needs of immigrants awaiting their day in
U.S. immigration court.9 Since the MPP was announced in December 2018,10 those
subject to it have become targets of robbery, extortion, rape, and assault in the

5. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Migrant Protection Protocols ( Jan. 24, 2019)
[hereinafter Migrant Protection Protocols Press Release], https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/
migrant-protection-protocols [ https://perma.cc/NE5A-APEZ ].
6. Id.
7. Access to Attorneys Difficult for Those Required to Remain in Mexico, TRAC IMMIGR. ( July 29,
2019), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/568/ [ https://perma.cc/63KB-PJFW ] (finding
that only 1.3% of pending MPP cases were represented as of June 2019).
8. Michael Garcia Bochenek, US: ‘Remain in Mexico’ Program Harming Children,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 12, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/12/us-remainmexico-program-harming-children# [ https://perma.cc/S5UY-9QDC ] (“To get to court hearings in
the United States, families must report to a designated border crossing point, which sometimes requires
them to arrive as early as 3 a.m. in unsafe locations. Those sent to Mexicali or Piedras Negras must
make journeys of 160 to 550 kilometers (100 to 340 miles) to reach their designated border
crossing point.”).
9. Telephone Interview with Tania García Barajas, Legal Clinic Coordinator, Espacio Migrante
(Dec. 12, 2019). This Note focuses on the MPP’s impact on asylum applicants and the U.S. immigration
court system. Therefore, the history of bilateral relations between the U.S. and Mexican governments,
the bilateral negotiations that produced the MPP, and the detailed terms of the MPP agreement between
the United States and Mexico are outside the scope of this Note. However, both parties’ briefs on the
motion requesting a stay of the Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming the preliminary injunction alluded to
some of the diplomatic controversy inherent in this policy. In rendering its decision, the court
considered declarations from Trump administration diplomats stating, “[The] MPP was a carefully
negotiated solution with the [g]overnment of Mexico. . . . The suspension of [the] MPP undermines
almost two years’ worth of diplomatic engagement with the [g]overnment of Mexico through which a
coordinated and cohesive immigration control program has been developed.” Innovation L. Lab
v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 2020) (granting in part and denying in part a motion for stay of
preliminary injunction pending decision on writ of certiorari). In contrast, the court also cited to a
declaration from the former Mexican ambassador to the United States, which was submitted with the
plaintiffs’ brief, stating, “The government of Mexico has consistently stated that MPP is a policy
unilaterally imposed by the U.S. government. To the extent Mexico agreed to the policy, it was upon
threat of heavy and unprecedented tariffs. . . . I reject the notion that this Court’s determination that
MPP is likely unlawful will harm our two nations’ relationship. Rather, it is MPP itself—and the way
the current administration is conducting policy towards Mexico—that is particularly detrimental to the
bilateral relationship between the United States and Mexico.” Id. at 990–91.
10. Nielsen Press Release, supra note 3.
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Mexican border towns where they must now wait for their immigration claims to
be heard.11
Under the terms of the MPP, the U.S. government returns families seeking
asylum at the southern border to Mexico on a discretionary basis for the duration
of their removal proceedings.12 The applicants return to the port of entry on the
day of their hearing and United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
transports them directly to the nearest immigration court. The MPP inherently
contradicts the purpose of the asylum system, which is intended as a complement
to the refugee admissions process.13 Persons seeking to enter as refugees must apply
for refugee status outside of the United States and wait to receive a decision before
they may enter.14 In contrast, the asylum process is designed to address the reality
that many dangers create exigencies such that affected individuals cannot wait
outside the United States for relief.15 Prior to the MPP, individuals who applied for
asylum, either within a U.S. territory or at a port of entry, remained in the United
States for the duration of their asylum proceeding and adjudication.16 The MPP
upends the intent of the asylum system by turning asylum into a process that looks
more like refugee admissions. As a result, asylum seekers must now await the
outcome of a lengthy immigration proceeding while outside the United
States—often without regard to the dangers that caused them to flee to the United
States or any new dangers they encountered en route.
While Al Otro Lado’s weekly pro se clinic has become invaluable because of
the near impossibility of finding attorneys who can assist individuals with a pending
U.S. immigration case while stuck in Mexico, its services remain a poor substitute
for full legal representation. Most clinic appointments are onetime meetings, and
because of low volunteer attorney capacity and difficulties in tracking clients as they
move through the U.S. immigration system, Al Otro Lado can only rarely conduct
meaningful follow-up. As the government has expanded the MPP, asylum seekers
are now also sent to Mexican border cities far less resourced and even more
dangerous than Tijuana, like Nuevo Laredo or Matamoros, where the Department
of State has issued a Level 4 (Do Not Travel) advisory.17

11. TOM K. WONG & VANESSA CECEÑA, U.S. IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR., SEEKING ASYLUM: PART
2, at 5 (2019), https://usipc.ucsd.edu/publications/usipc-seeking-asylum-part-2-final.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/2Q96-7AYW ].
12. Nielsen Press Release, supra note 3.
13. See infra notes 26–34 and accompanying text.
14. Refugees, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/
refugees-and-asylum/refugees [ https://perma.cc/XLK6-PUZE ] (May 7, 2020).
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1521 note (1980) (Congressional Declaration of Policies and Objectives).
16. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2020), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/asylum_in_the_united_states.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/CM9H-MQJH ] (“U.S. law provides arriving asylum seekers the right to remain in
the United States while their claim for protection is pending . . . .”).
17. A Level 4 travel advisory indicates the Department of State strongly recommends citizens
do not travel to specific countries/regions. Mexico Travel Advisory, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, https://
travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html
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Besides the concerns surrounding safe return to the port of entry and securing
legal representation, the humanitarian impact of this policy has been staggering.
Families who must wait, unexpectedly, in Mexico for several months lack stable
housing, employment, education, or the support network of friends and family
members many had been counting on in the United States.18 The impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting economic and political crisis in the United
States has further exacerbated the dangers of the MPP.19 Confined to border camps
that are unsafe and unsanitary, asylum seekers have extremely restricted access to
the health and safety infrastructure that they need.20 As of December 2020, the
U.S. government had returned over 70,467 immigrants to Mexico subject to
the MPP.21
Administration officials argue that this policy is a necessary measure to address
an immigration emergency.22 But with the MPP and a slew of other policies
promulgated over the past several decades, the government has actually
manufactured a border crisis of unprecedented proportions.23 The MPP has also
significantly deteriorated the legal system designed to assess who should be granted
asylum protections according to U.S. immigration law.

[ https://perma.cc/4F5B-SEQU ] (Sept. 8, 2020); see also Letter from Blaine Bookey, Ctr. for Gender
& Refugee Stud., U.C. Hastings Coll. of the L., Judy Rabinovitz, Immigrants’ Rts. Project,
Am. Civ. Liberties Union, to Chad F. Wolf, Acting Sec’y of Homeland Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., Mark A. Morgan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Matthew T. Albence, Acting
Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Mario Martinez, Chief Patrol Agent, Laredo Sector, U.S. Customs
& Border Prot., and Manuel Padilla, Jr., Chief Patrol Agent, Rio Grande Valley Sector, U.S. Customs
& Border Prot. 3 (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_
document/letter_to_dhs_all_exhibits.pdf [ https://perma.cc/JUG6-3B6P ] (“[State Department]
advisories . . . prohibit U.S. government employees from traveling between cities in Tamaulipas using
interior Mexican highways and requiring them to observe a curfew between midnight and 6:00 a.m. in
the cities of Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo. Notwithstanding these dangers, asylum seekers with
immigration proceedings in Brownsville and Laredo are expected to be present at those ports of entry
well before 6:00 a.m. in order to arrive at their court hearings on time.”).
18. Telephone Interview with Tania García Barajas, supra note 9.
19. See US: COVID-19 Policies Risk Asylum Seekers’ Lives, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 2, 2020,
8:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/us-covid-19-policies-risk-asylum-seekers-lives
[ https://perma.cc/Y3BE-K84V ] (noting that many asylum seekers subject to the MPP lack basic
necessities like clean, running water, which are necessary to follow health recommendations during the
COVID-19 pandemic).
20. Id.
21. Details on MPP (Remain in Mexico) Deportation Proceedings, TRAC IMMIGR., https://
trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/mpp/ [ https://perma.cc/9HWN-7YEG ] ( l ast visited
Jan. 18, 2021 ).
22. See Nielsen Press Release, supra note 3 (announcing the MPP as “historic measures to bring
the illegal immigration crisis under control”).
23. Many others have written about the construction of migration crises. See, e.g., Jaya
Ramji-Nogales, Migration Emergencies, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 609 (2017) (discussing construction of a
migration crisis through the lens of international migration law). However, I distinguish the example of
the MPP because the sole reason that there are such sprawling border encampments on the U.S.-Mexico
border today is that the United States has not allowed asylum seekers entry across its borders under the
terms of the MPP.
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In this Note, I argue that the consequences of the MPP on immigrants seeking
asylum, including lacking access to counsel and remaining in danger while in
Mexico, combine to create a wholesale failure of the immigration legal system,
rendering the asylum adjudicative process virtually meaningless. Part I provides
context for the MPP by tracing the lineage of the U.S. asylum system and the
evolution of asylum policy that led to this point. Part II describes the MPP itself
and the most severe consequences of the policy. Finally, Part III evaluates pushback
against the MPP, discussing how legislators, humanitarians, community
organizations, and legal advocates are challenging the implementation of this
dangerous policy. So far, journalists, activists, and litigators have been the primary
investigators exposing the dire repercussions of the MPP.24 Therefore, this Note is
among the first pieces of legal scholarship to explore the policy at length.25
I. THE MPP CONTINUES A POLITICAL TRAJECTORY LIMITING ACCESS TO
ASYLUM
The MPP was not created in a vacuum. Rather, decades of increasing
restrictions on asylum have contributed to a political environment in which this
policy could be tenable. I argue that a series of policy shifts throughout the last
several decades have eroded asylum protections and laid the groundwork for
the MPP.
A. Refugee and Asylum Framework
Under United States law, there are two primary processes through which
foreign nationals can receive fear-based protection: refugee admissions and
asylum.26 Refugees apply for refugee status outside the United States and enter the
country only after they are granted status as refugees, while asylees apply for and are
granted asylum after entering the United States, regardless of the manner of entry.27
24. See, e.g., Jonathan Blitzer, How the U.S. Asylum System Is Keeping Migrants at Risk in Mexico,
NEW YORKER (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-the-us-asylumsystem-is-keeping-migrants-at-risk-in-mexico [ https://web.archive.org/web/20210118213848/
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-the-us-asylum-system-is-keeping-migrants-at-riskin-mexico ]; Wong, supra note 11; Complaint, Innovation L. Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 3:19-cv-00807-RS).
25. Scholars have written short updates on the policy and its harmful impact as part of longer
articles describing Trump’s immigration policies; but, they have not explored the MPP in its long-term
context or delved deeply into its impact on affected communities. See, e.g., Fatma E. Marouf,
Extraterritorial Rights in Border Enforcement, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751, 764–69 (2020); Sabrineh
Ardalan, Refugee Protection at Risk: Remain in Mexico and Other Efforts to Undermine the U.S. Asylum
System, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 26, 2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/refugeeprotection-at-risk-remain-in-mexico-and-other-efforts-to-undermine-the-u-s-asylum-system/ [ https://
perma.cc/G8WS-72ET ]; Favio Ramirez Caminatti, Examining the Legality of the Migrant Protection
Protocols (MPP), MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV.: AMICUS CURIAE BLOG (Mar. 18, 2020), https://
mitchellhamline.edu/law-review/2020/03/18/legality-migrant-protection-protocols-mpp-asylum-seekers/
[ https://perma.cc/R8DS-AL3H ].
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1521 note (1980) (Congressional Declaration of Policies and Objectives).
27. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102–05.
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With the design of these systems, the government has recognized that some crises
create exigent dangers under which people cannot wait to proceed through the
refugee process but must immediately seek protection within U.S. borders.28
Therefore, unlike refugee admissions, there are no ceilings on grants of asylum.29
United States refugee and asylum laws are derived in part from international
treaty obligations.30 The legal standard to qualify as either a refugee or asylee
requires a showing of a well-founded fear of persecution.31 This standard originates
from the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
echoes nonrefoulement, a customary principle of international law, providing “[n]o
Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.”32
Every year, the President, in consultation with Congress, authorizes
resettlement of a specified number of refugees, including the designated
nationalities and processing priorities for each nationality.33 However, the number
of actual admissions rarely reaches these admission ceilings.34 In each of the last
several years, the Trump administration set the United States Annual Refugee
Resettlement Ceilings at historic lows.35 The cap for 2019 was 30,000 refugees, the

28. 8 U.S.C. § 1521 note (1980) (Congressional Declaration of Policies and Objectives) (“The
Congress declares that it is the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of
persons subject to persecution in their homelands, including, where appropriate, humanitarian
assistance for their care and maintenance in asylum areas, efforts to promote opportunities for
resettlement or voluntary repatriation, aid for necessary transportation and processing, admission to
this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and transitional assistance
to refugees in the United States.”).
29. Refugee Act § 208(a).
30. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954), as modified by Article I of the 1967 Protocol;
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [ hereinafter 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees ].
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (“The term ‘refugee’ means . . . any person who is outside any
country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .”).
32. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 30. While the United States never
ratified the 1951 Convention, it did become party to the 1967 Protocol, thereby agreeing to the
definition and refugee protections set forth in the 1951 treaty. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, supra note 30.
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1157.
34. U.S. Annual Refugee Resettlement Ceilings and Number of Refugees Admitted, 1980-Present,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/us-annualrefugee-resettlement-ceilings-and-number-refugees-admitted-united#:~:text=Actual%20admissions%
20for%20those%20years,annual%20ceiling%2C%20both%20at%2030%2C000 [ https://perma.cc/
D23K-VFQN ] ( last visited Jan. 18, 2021 ).
35. Id.
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lowest ceiling since 1980,36 while the 2020 ceiling was a mere 18,000 refugees,37 of
which only 11,814 were actually admitted.38 The ceiling for 2021 is 15,000
refugees.39 As opportunities to escape danger through the refugee system dwindle,
more people are pushed into the asylum system through which they must apply for
protection at a port of entry or inside U.S. borders.
The 1980 Refugee Act codified our asylum system by tasking the Attorney
General with establishing a procedure allowing any person to apply for asylum who
is “physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United
States . . . irrespective of such alien’s status.”40 The right to seek asylum in the
United States is available to anyone, even if they lack prior permission to enter the
country and regardless of their manner of entry.41 The 1980 Refugee Act amended
U.S. law, mandating immigration authorities withhold or forego deportation for
noncitizens who would face persecution if they returned to a foreign country.42 The
Act is based on the underlying principle that people seeking safety from harm
require protection, and the policies affecting them should take care to avoid the
dangers they have faced and may continue to face.43
Prior to the MPP, there were three paths through which adults or families44
could submit an application for asylum. Asylum could be sought (1) affirmatively
through United States Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) if a person is not
currently in removal proceedings, (2) defensively if the person has already been

36. Priscilla Alvarez, U.S. Sets a Refugee Cap of 18,000 for Next Year - a New Historic Low,
CNN (Sept. 26, 2019, 7:06 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/26/politics/refugee-cap-historiclow/index.html [ https://web.archive.org/web/20210118215200/https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/
26/politics/refugee-cap-historic-low/index.html ].
37. Refugee Admissions, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/refugee-admissions/
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20200808205414/https://www.state.gov/refugee-admissions/ ] ( last
visited Aug. 8, 2020 ).
38. Admissions & Arrivals, REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR., https://www.wrapsnet.org/
admissions-and-arrivals/ [ https://perma.cc/V4F5-JTZE ] ( last visited Jan. 18, 2021 ).
39. Press Release, Off. of the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, Transmission of the
President’s Report to Congress on the Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 2021 (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://www.state.gov/transmission-of-the-presidents-report-to-congress-on-the-proposed-refugeeadmissions-for-fiscal-year-2021/ [ https://perma.cc/3TA5-ZMSW ]. The Biden administration has
promised to reverse the Trump administration’s refugee policy and raise the admissions ceiling to
125,000, but officials are likely to initially face resource and logistical barriers to reaching this ceiling.
Abigail Hauslohner, Biden Wants More Refugees, But It Could Take Years to Rebuild the Resettlement
System, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/
02/biden-refugees-resettlement-trump/ [ https://perma.cc/D2W2-J9R3 ].
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).
41. Id.
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if
the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country
because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”).
43. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 30.
44. Unaccompanied minors can also apply for asylum through USCIS even if they are already
in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(C).
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served with a Notice to Appear45 and is in removal proceedings, or (3) defensively
if they are placed in expedited removal but receive a positive credible fear
determination and are scheduled for a hearing before an immigration judge.46 In the
latter two options, the asylum application is eventually considered and decided upon
by an immigration judge following a hearing in immigration court.47
Despite these statutory provisions and constitutional standards requiring
minimum due process in immigration court hearings, procedural inequities persist.
Even before implementation of the MPP, immigration courts struggled to live up
to the foundational U.S. legal principles that cases be adjudicated “by reference to
standardized norms rather than by arbitrary factors, particularly the personal biases,
attitudes, policies, or ideologies of government adjudicators.”48 In addition,
substantive complexity and heavy caseloads have led immigration judges themselves
to remark that they are “holding death penalty cases in traffic court.”49 Despite the
high stakes of immigration proceedings, the significant weight placed on judicial
discretion in immigration court decisions translates into wide variation across
jurisdictions, and decisions about immigration relief are often relatively arbitrary.50
In light of these realities, advocates have increasingly questioned the accuracy of
outcomes in the modern immigration legal system.51
B. Modern Evolution of Asylum Policy
The MPP is among the latest in a succession of immigration policies since the
1990s placing more and more restrictions on the asylum system, making it
increasingly difficult to secure asylum protections in the United States. These

45. Notice to Appear Policy Memorandum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/other-resources/notice-to-appear-policy-memorandum
[ https://
perma.cc/Q4PE-HJDK ] (Feb. 26, 2019) (“An NTA is a document that instructs an individual to
appear before an immigration judge. This is the first step in starting removal proceedings
against them.”).
46. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2020).
47. Id.
48. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 299–300 (2007).
49. Julia Preston, Lawyers Back Creating New Immigration Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/us/09immig.html [ https://perma.cc/S2YT-F835 ].
50. Nogales et al., supra note 48 at 373 (“A Colombian asylum seeker might be assigned to a
judge who granted asylum in 5% of his 426 cases during the period of our study or to another who
granted asylum in 88% of his 334 cases.”).
51. See, e.g., Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 7 (2018)
(discussing the impact of executive branch decisions on the “individual fairness, democratic
accountability, accuracy, efficiency, and fidelity to separation-of-powers principles” in the immigration
court system). In addition, a study of immigration court outcomes found that IJs were more likely to
order removal under the Trump administration than in prior administrations, irrespective of which
President appointed the IJ. Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, An Empirical Study of Political Control
over Immigration Adjudication, 108 GEO. L.J. 579, 585 (2020) (analyzing data about the outcomes of
immigration proceedings which suggests that the sitting President may assert some influence over
immigration judges’ removal decisions).
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policies were established through executive orders, by statute, in agency rules, or as
part of enforcement practices.
In 1996, amid a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment, Congress passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Key provisions
in the IIRIRA significantly reduced the availability of asylum protections for
vulnerable people knocking at the gates to the United States. Some of the most
dramatic changes that the IIRIRA introduced included expedited removal,
mandatory detention for some asylum seekers without a case-by-case analysis, the
one-year asylum application filing deadline, and additional limitations on judicial
review for asylum applications.52 Many of these provisions deviated significantly
from the international law norms that U.S. refugee and asylum law had reflected
until that point.53
One example of the procedures instituted at this time was expedited removal,
a formal removal process that occurs without a hearing in immigration court.54
When a noncitizen seeks to enter the United States without valid entry documents,55
the inspecting officer “shall order the alien removed without further hearing or
review.”56 IIRIRA created a system in which most asylum seekers, before the advent
of the MPP, were presumptively part of the expedited removal process until and
unless they could show a reasonable possibility of credible fear; only then would
they receive a hearing before an immigration judge. This assessment, known as the
credible fear interview (CFI), is the primary defense to expedited removal, but it is
still a limited one.57 A positive credible fear determination allows asylum applicants
targeted for expedited removal to instead present their asylum claim at a hearing
presided over by an immigration judge.58 Expedited removal in general has had a
tremendous effect on U.S. immigration enforcement: in 2017, about thirty-five
percent of all noncitizens the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
apprehended were removed through this process.59 Consequently, expedited
removal has been widely criticized as presenting one of the greatest risks of

52. Ava C. Benach, Feature, The Border: How We Got Here, 34 CRIM. JUST. 27, 28–30 (2019);
Karen Musalo & Marcelle Rice, The Implementation of the One-Year Ban to Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMPAR. L. REV. 693, 693 (2008).
53. See Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 118 (2001).
54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
55. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i) (describing documentation requirements at the time of
application for admission).
56. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
57. Jennifer Lee Koh, Barricading the Immigration Courts, 69 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 48, 53 (2020)
[ hereinafter Koh, Barricading ].
58. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“If the officer determines at the time of the interview that an alien has
a credible fear of persecution (within the meaning of clause (v)), the alien shall be detained for further
consideration of the application for asylum.”).
59. OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2017, at 9, 12 (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/enforcement_actions_2017.pdf [ https://perma.cc/F4ZJ-J57X ].
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refoulement because it lacks robust procedural safeguards to effectively determine
whether someone with a genuine fear of persecution may be expelled.60
In addition, the rise of mandatory detention for asylum seekers has severely
compromised any hope for the asylum system to offer safe and humane
adjudication. IIRIRA authorized any asylum seeker to be locked up for some period
of time—a carceral regime that has grown to detain over 400,000 people every
year.61 In addition, detention centers are usually located far outside urban areas,
making them less accessible to attorneys and families.62 Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) often moves detainees from one detention center to another
without notifying the counsel of record and without regard for the detention
center’s distance from the detainees’ support network.63
As gang violence in Central America escalated, in part due to U.S. foreign
policy, children and families fled to the United States in even greater numbers.64
The U.S. government’s response to that influx was to expand detention.65 Children
and families in detention are usually pursuing claims for asylum, so the expansion
of the detention system created a new status quo in which families seeking asylum
would often be automatically detained in deplorable conditions and deported soon
thereafter.66 The conditions of immigrant detention, especially family detention,
have been widely criticized for failing to offer adequate food, heating, sanitation, or
medical care.67 Further, prominent legal scholars and activists have recently
amplified the call for the abolition of immigrant detention in the United States,
arguing that detention is not an essential ingredient of immigration enforcement

60. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
198–99 (2019) [ hereinafter Koh, Removal in Shadows ].
61. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226; CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO
PRISON: AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS 82 (2019).
62. Darlene C. Goring, Freedom from Detention: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Detention for
Criminal Aliens Seeking to Challenge Grounds for Removal, 69 ARK. L. REV. 911, 912 (2017) (“Detention
facilities are secure, prison-like facilities that are usually located in remote, rural areas.”).
63. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 61, at 140.
64. See Julian Borger, Fleeing a Hell the U.S. Helped Create: Why Central Americans Journey
North, GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/19/
central-america-migrants-us-foreign-policy [ https://perma.cc/A32S-JRLQ ] (“Jakelin Amei Rosmery
Caal Maquín, who died of septic shock and cardiac arrest in US border patrol custody, came from Alta
Verapaz, in the northern Guatemala highlands, where small-scale farmers are being driven off their land
to make way for agro-industry producing sugar and biofuels. . . . The MS-13 gang, frequently referred
to by Donald Trump in justification of his hardline immigration policies, was formed in Los Angeles,
and introduced into El Salvador when its members were deported – often to a country they barely
knew . . . .”).
65. Benach, supra note 52, at 29.
66. Kristina M. Campbell, Dreamers Deferred: The Broken Promise of Immigration Reform in the
Obama Years, 25 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 20–23 (2018).
67. See LUTHERAN IMMIGR. & REFUGEE SERV. & WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, LOCKING
UP FAMILY VALUES, AGAIN: THE CONTINUED FAILURE OF IMMIGRATION FAMILY DETENTION 2
(2014) (finding that “[f]amily detention cannot be carried out humanely,” “families are detained
arbitrarily,” and “[f]amily detention inherently denies due process and impedes migrants’ ability to
access the immigration legal system”).
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and that the immigration detention status quo fails to respect the humanity of
immigrants who have sought refuge here.68
In 2001, the U.S. government took steps to further erode the rights and
protections of asylum seekers—not through the immigration court system, but
through the criminal courts. The Bush administration initiated the now infamous
Operation Streamline, a partnership between DHS and the Department of Justice
to facilitate the large-scale criminal prosecution of immigrants for the federal crimes
of illegal entry and reentry.69 Operation Streamline included asylum seekers as part
of its larger project to criminalize migration.70 Asylum seekers are still regularly
prosecuted for illegal entry and reentry despite domestic and international law
forbidding the government from penalizing asylum seekers for their presence within
U.S. territory without authorization.71 During the Bush and Obama administrations,
Operation Streamline operated in eight district courts along the U.S.-Mexico border
and peaked at nearly 98,000 prosecutions in 2013.72
By the end of the Obama administration, the detention and criminal
prosecution of asylum seekers was standard government practice.73 The increasing
use of expedited removal, detention, and criminal prosecution as tools to restrict
and penalize entry of asylum seekers in the early 2000s already evidenced a disregard
for due process and for the safety and humanity of these immigrants.74 Such policies
set the stage for the Trump administration to further undermine the fairness of the
asylum process.
C. The Trump Administration’s Attacks on Asylum
As he promised throughout his campaign, former President Trump wielded
his executive power to curtail the rights of immigrants, including asylum seekers.75
President Trump consistently tried to paint asylum seekers as criminals and

68. See, e.g., GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 61, at 156–57 (“Forcing migrants to live under
the constant threat of imprisonment tied to their immigration status means treating them as if they are
workers and threats before they are people.”).
69. See Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 481, 484 (2010); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325–1326.
70. Lydgate, supra note 69, at 495–96.
71. Natasha Arnpriester, Trumping Asylum: Criminal Prosecutions for “Illegal” Entry and Reentry
Violate the Rights of Asylum Seekers, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 3, 7 (2017) (noting that Article 31 of
the 1951 Convention states that parties to the treaty “shall not impose penalties, on account of their
illegal entry or presence, on refugees who . . . enter or are present in their territory
without authorization”).
72. Id. at 13.
73. Michael Tan, President Obama Wants to Continue Imprisoning Immigrant Families, ACLU
(Aug. 10, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/mass-incarceration/presidentobama-wants-continue-imprisoning-immigrant-families [ https://perma.cc/6XXL-YYWK ].
74. See id.; Lydgate, supra note 69, at 487; Koh, Removal in Shadows, supra note 60, at 198–99.
75. William Finnegan, Comment, Trump and the Refugees, NEW YORKER (Oct. 2, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/trump-and-the-refugees [ https://perma.cc/
5KZN-9RF6 ].
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“denounced international standards on refugee protection as legal ‘loopholes’ and
‘magic words’ that the administration [ ] professed its intention to abolish.”76
Immediately after assuming office, former President Trump issued an
executive order that further limited the ability of asylum seekers to access legal
protection in the United States.77 This order continued criminal prosecutions
against asylum seekers for illegal reentry and foreshadowed the implementation of
the MPP by increasing immigrant detention and issuing new policy guidance to the
Department of Homeland Security regarding “the appropriate and consistent use
of lawful detention authority under the INA, including the termination of the
practice commonly known as ‘catch and release.’”78
In the summer of 2018, the Trump administration quietly rolled out the
“metering” or “turnback” policy through which CBP severely limits the number of
people allowed to request asylum at an official port of entry.79 This policy requires
asylum seekers to register on an informal paper list and wait months until their
number is called before their request for asylum will be processed.80 In light of the
total absence of any statutory, regulatory, or subregulatory written authority for the
policy, advocates had to sue the Trump administration before officials would even
admit they were operating a metering system.81 Metering violates the principle of
nonrefoulement because it does not allow individuals to seek asylum immediately
in order to escape the danger they are facing.82 Transforming U.S. asylum procedure
in this way ignores the exigencies of violence and fear that cause people to request
asylum in the first place. Unlike refugee admissions, the asylum system has no
numerical limitation on the number of asylum seekers entering the United States.83
Nevertheless, CBP and DHS officials have repeatedly suggested that metering is
necessary because there is “not enough space,” likely referring to the lack of space
in detention centers.84

76. USA: “You Don’t Have Any Rights Here,” AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/research/2018/10/usa-treatment-of-asylum-seekers-southern-border/ [ https://perma.cc/
9SPT-8JCH ] ( last visited Jan. 18, 2021 ).
77. Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 ( Jan. 30, 2017).
78. Id. The Trump administration has repeatedly described the MPP as replacing “catch and
release” with “catch and return.” Nielsen Press Release, supra note 3.
79. Dara Lind, The US Has Made Migrants at the Border Wait Months to Apply for Asylum.
Now the Dam Is Breaking., VOX (Nov. 28, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/28/
18089048/border-asylum-trump-metering-legally-ports
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20210114232846/https://www.vox.com/2018/11/28/18089048/bor
der-asylum-trump-metering-legally-ports ].
80. Id.; see also Koh, Barricading, supra note 57, at 56–58 (explaining how the metering policy
prevents immigrants from accessing immigration courts).
81. Koh, Barricading, supra note 57, at 57–58.
82. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157; supra note 34 and accompanying text.
83. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105.
84. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-65, INVESTIGATION
OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF IMMIGRATION LAWS AT THE TECATE, CALIFORNIA, PORT OF ENTRY
BY U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION PERSONNEL 6 (2019) (“[O]fficers and management

First to Printer_Johanson copy.docx (Do Not Delete)

2021 ]

THE MIGRANT PROTECTION PROTOCOLS

2/7/21 10:03 AM

887

The Trump administration has since attempted to issue wholesale bans on
asylum for the majority of applicants. The first ban was swiftly struck down in
court,85 but a new iteration was rolled out in the summer of 2019 that forbade access
to asylum for people who both passed through other countries before reaching the
United States and did not first seek protection in those countries.86 This “third
country” asylum ban was enjoined by a California district court, a decision that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in July 2020.87
The Trump administration has also limited access to asylum through less
visible yet insidious means like transforming the CFI guidance and bureaucracy in
the process of expedited removal. In the last few years, the Trump administration
released internal guidance encouraging asylum officers to issue more negative
credible fear determinations, arguing that the asylum system is overwhelmed and
cannot handle so many claims.88 This guidance has contributed to fewer positive
credible fear findings.89 CFIs are required by regulation to be conducted by USCIS
asylum officers who have extensive experience and training in assessing claims for
asylum relief.90 But throughout the summer of 2019, more and more CBP officers
were deputized to conduct these interviews.91 Like the internal credible fear
guidance, the use of more CBP officers to conduct CFIs as opposed to asylum
officers also resulted in fewer positive credible fear determinations.92
In November 2019, USCIS proposed a rule that would prevent asylum seekers
from receiving work authorization pending the adjudication of their asylum
application.93 This proposed change expressly seeks to “deter aliens from illegally
entering the United States and from filing frivolous, fraudulent or otherwise
non-meritorious asylum applications in order to obtain employment
cited [Tecate] Port’s lack of holding space and personnel trained in processing asylum claims, and the
challenges with transferring individuals when the Port closed at the end of the day.”).
85. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 844 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
86. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(4) (2020) (“[A]ny alien who enters, attempts to enter, or arrives in the
United States across the southern land border on or after July 16, 2019, after transiting through at least
one country outside the alien’s country of citizenship, nationality, or last lawful habitual residence en
route to the United States, shall be found ineligible.”).
87. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 964 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2020).
88. See Koh, Barricading, supra note 57, at 65.
89. Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL. L. REV. 707,
739 (2019) (noting that from February 2017 to June 2017, positive CFIs decreased from seventy-eight
percent to sixty-eight percent).
90. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a) (2020) (vesting jurisdiction over credible fear interviews with Refugee,
Asylum, and International Operations); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i) (stating that “asylum officer[s]
shall conduct” credible fear interviews).
91. Molly O’Toole, Border Patrol Agents, Rather than Asylum Officers, Interviewing Families for
‘Credible Fear,’ L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/201909-19/border-patrol-interview-migrant-families-credible-fear
[ https://web.archive.org/web/202
01114042644/https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-09-19/border-patrol-interview-migrantfamilies-credible-fear ].
92. Id.
93. Asylum Application, Interview, and Employment Authorization for Applicants, 85
Fed. Reg. 38,532, 38,533 (June 26, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 274a).
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authorization.”94 Without the ability to work legally, applicants may be unable to
support themselves and their families and are pushed into even more vulnerability.
While the explicit goal of this rule may be to discourage fraudulent asylum
applications, the effect of many deterrence-based policies is that, rather than
remaining in their home countries where they face almost certain torture,
kidnapping, or death, people who fear for their lives are simply taking more
dangerous routes into the United States and seeking informal employment or
unsafe housing.95
On June 15, 2020, the Trump administration proposed another rule that
further chipped away at due process in the asylum system by allowing immigration
judges to deny asylum claims based solely on the asylum application without
providing an opportunity for asylum seekers to present their case at a hearing.96
Seizing on the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to further eliminate asylum
protections, the government proposed an additional rule on July 9, 2020, permitting
immigration judges and DHS officials to “categorically bar from eligibility for
asylum . . . as dangers to the security of the United States, aliens who potentially risk
bringing in deadly infectious disease to, or facilitating its spread within, the United
States.”97 Considering the tremendous discretionary power that immigration judges
already wield, such broad rules permit even greater variation, bias, and
discrimination to proliferate in asylum adjudication.
The MPP was introduced in a context of increasing restrictions on the ability
of asylum seekers to enter the United States throughout the last few decades. The
Trump administration has accelerated this troubling trend by instituting harmful
new procedures with alarming speed and ferocity. Many of these policies were direct
executive actions, bypassing even limited administrative law procedural checks like
notice and comment.98 Thus, the impact of the MPP has been exponentially more

94. Press Release, U.S. Citizenzhip & Immgr. Servs., USCIS to Deter Frivolous or Fraudulent
Asylum Seekers from Obtaining Work Authorizations (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/news/
news-releases/uscis-to-deter-frivolous-or-fraudulent-asylum-seekers-from-obtaining-work-authorizations
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20201201142842/https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscisto-deter-frivolous-or-fraudulent-asylum-seekers-from-obtaining-work-authorizations ].
95. For instance, because the metering policy creates such long wait times for those on the list,
approximately thirteen times the number of people who are on the list instead find their way across the
border because they cannot afford to wait in Mexico. James Fredrick, ‘Metering’ at the Border, NPR
( June 29, 2019, 8:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/29/737268856/metering-at-the-border
[ https://perma.cc/DR3Y-DT9W ].
96. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear
Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, 36,277 (June 15, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1208, 1235);
Michael Breen, Michael Breen on the Proposed June 15th Asylum Regulation, HUM. RTS. FIRST
( July 9, 2020), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/michael-breen-proposed-june-15thasylum-regulation [ https://perma.cc/S5CE-KYZ9 ].
97. Security Bars and Processing, 85 Fed. Reg. 41,201, 41,208 (proposed July 9, 2020) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 1208).
98. A court has already held that the MPP procedures for addressing an individual’s risk of
persecution if returned to Mexico violated 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) and (c) because DHS had adopted a rule
without providing notice and an opportunity for comment. Innovation L. Lab v. Nielsen, 366
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damaging because of the slew of coinciding policies that together hinder the
potential for the United States to offer safe haven through its asylum system.
II. THE MPP AND ITS DEVASTATING IMPACT
The Department of Homeland Security first announced the MPP on
December 20, 2018.99 DHS relied on the statutory authority in section 235(b)(2)(C)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which states:
In the case of an alien . . . who is arriving on land (whether or not at a
designated port of arrival) from a foreign territory contiguous to the United
States, the Attorney General may return the alien to that territory pending
a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.100
Using its interpretation of this statute, the government argues that individuals
entering the United States from Mexico “may be returned to Mexico for the
duration of their immigration proceedings.”101 Immigrants placed under the MPP
are not subject to expedited removal but rather receive full hearings on their claims
before an immigration judge.102 As the program has expanded, shelters in larger
border towns and cities like Tijuana, Mexicali, and Ciudad Juarez have been
completely overwhelmed, and the thousands stuck at the border subject to the MPP
have instead been relegated to sprawling, makeshift camps.103 These tent camps are
easy targets for criminal organizations and are overrun with vermin and disease.104
The MPP exemplifies the cruel shift in immigration law and policy that the
executive branch has spearheaded in recent years.
A. Dangers of Refoulement
The MPP presents an unprecedented violation of the domestic and
international legal principle of nonrefoulement because asylum applicants subject
to this policy are often forcibly returned to a country in which they face danger.105

F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d sub nom. Innovation L. Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073 (9th
Cir.), and cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 617 (2020).
99. Nielsen Press Release, supra note 3.
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C); Migrant Protection Protocols Press Release, supra note 5.
101. Nielsen Press Release, supra note 3.
102. Migrant Protection Protocols Press Release, supra note 5.
103. See Alexa Liautaud, Thousands of Migrants in Tent City Limbo After Supreme Court Keeps
‘Remain in Mexico’ in Place, NBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2020, 2:04 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/
latino/thousands-migrants-tent-city-limbo-after-supreme-court-keeps-remain-n1155996
[ https://
perma.cc/5QE4-3NH5 ] (describing a tent camp of 2,500 migrants in Matamoros that grows by
approximately 50 to 100 people every day).
104. See Zolan Kanno-Youngs, ‘He Turned Purple’: U.S. Overlooks Ill Asylum Seekers,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/22/us/politics/trump-asylumremain-in-mexico.html [ https://perma.cc/N2XR-4RE3 ]; Delivered to Danger: Trump Administration
Sending Asylum Seekers and Migrants to Danger, DELIVERED TO DANGER [ hereinafter DELIVERED
TO DANGER ], https://deliveredtodanger.org/ [ https://perma.cc/YL8S-EWLB ] ( last visited
Jan. 18, 2021 ).
105. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text for definition of nonrefoulement.
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The MPP theoretically has mechanisms to avoid refoulement. The program
explicitly excludes the following groups: Mexican nationals, returning legal
permanent residents, those with known physical and/or mental health issues, those
with a history of violence, unaccompanied children, and those more likely than not
to face persecution or torture in Mexico.106 In order to be identified as someone in
the last category and avoid being forcibly returned to Mexico, the asylum
applicant must:
[a]ffirmatively stat[e] that he or she has a fear of persecution or torture in
Mexico, or a fear of return to Mexico, whether before or after they are
processed for MPP or other disposition, [and then they] will be referred to
a USCIS asylum officer for screening . . . so that the asylum officer can
assess whether it is more likely than not that the alien will face persecution
or torture if returned to Mexico.107
This procedure demands a higher standard than the “reasonable possibility”
of persecution standard applied in CFIs, the procedure used in expedited removal
to safeguard against refoulement.108 Even if the applicant has already been a victim
of persecution in Mexico, they must also show that it is more likely than not that
the violence will reoccur.109 Because of this high standard and the cursory nature of
the assessment, only about five percent of people subject to the MPP have been
able to successfully avoid being placed in the program or are able to get removed
from it.110 Advocates working in Mexican border towns have noted how DHS’s
refoulement screening process under this program fails to safeguard against the risk
of persecution for their clients subject to the MPP.111 As of October 2019,
23.1% of respondents have been threatened with physical violence since they were

106. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MPP GUIDING
PRINCIPLES (2019) [ hereinafter MPP GUIDING PRINCIPLES ], https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/
files/assets/documents/2019-Jan/MPP%20Guiding%20Principles%201-28-19.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/8LQZ-8ZTJ ].
107. Id.
108. Memorandum from U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. on Guidance for Processing
Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum, and Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of A-B-, at 8
(July 11, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/memos/2018-06-18-PM-6020162-USCIS-Memorandum-Matter-of-A-B.PDF [ https://perma.cc/MSN9-W2HJ ]; THE OFF. OF
U.S. SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY, SHATTERED REFUGE: A U.S. SENATE INVESTIGATION INTO THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S GUTTING OF ASYLUM 35 (2019) [ hereinafter SHATTERED REFUGE ]
(“The ‘more likely than not’ standard is far more stringent than the low threshold standard asylum
officers were traditionally instructed to use when conducting credible fear interviews . . . .”).
109. Debbie Nathan, An Asylum Officer Speaks Out Against the Trump Administration’s
“Supervillain” Attacks on Immigrants, INTERCEPT (Sept. 13, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://theintercept.com/
2019/09/13/asylum-interview-immigration-trump/ [ https://perma.cc/6575-WY9A ].
110. Id. (“The scary part is that the officer doesn’t have to justify their decision [whether to
place someone under the MPP]. They just check a ‘yes’ or a ‘no.’ So you can’t know what the quality of
their analysis was.” (quoting an asylum officer)).
111. Telephone Interview with Tania García Barajas, supra note 9. Ms. García Barajas noted that
organized crime throughout Central America has escalated in response to the MPP policy and the
resulting presence of thousands of vulnerable immigrants stranded at the Mexican border. See also
DELIVERED TO DANGER, supra note 104.
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returned to Mexico to await their court dates.112 Of those who received threats of
physical violence, 56.5% have actually experienced physical violence, including
being beaten, robbed, or extorted.113 Despite expressing a fear of return to Mexico,
CBP nevertheless placed six out of ten survey respondents under the MPP without
further investigating the fear they expressed.114
Besides guarding against refoulement, the MPP guidelines are also supposed
to exempt those who have known physical health issues, mental health issues, or
both.115 But in practice, people with serious health issues, as well as those with issues
that have become exacerbated due to exposure and lack of access to healthcare and
basic necessities, are often still subject to the MPP.116 Journalists have reported such
serious violations as people with HIV, cancer, or over age seventy being subject to
the MPP.117 One fifty-two-year-old woman subject to the MPP and waiting near
Matamoros, Mexico, has been infected with a parasite while waiting in a tent camp
on the border and is quickly losing her vision.118 Within six months of being subject
to the MPP, she has become completely blind in one eye and partially blind in the
other.119 Even with support from an attorney—an asset which most of those subject
to the MPP lack—her request to temporarily enter the United States to seek medical
treatment was denied four times.120
Under the terms of the MPP, CBP retains the right to use its discretion to
choose whether to process applicants for admission to the United States through
the MPP, expedited removal, parole, or other processing or removal mechanisms.121
While agency discretion is broad, DHS regularly violates its own exclusions and
exceptions to the MPP.122 For instance, the office of U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley
(D-OR) documented at least seven cases of women in late-term pregnancies who
were returned to Mexico in violation of DHS’s own MPP physical health
exclusions.123 Considering the way the MPP has marginalized those individuals with
isolated health conditions, it has only exacerbated the generalized health risk posed
by the COVID-19 pandemic.124
112. Wong, supra note 11, at 9.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 8. As of May 13, 2020, there are at least 1,114 publicly reported cases of murder,
rape, torture, kidnapping, and other violent assaults against asylum seekers forced to return to Mexico
under the MPP. DELIVERED TO DANGER, supra note 104.
115. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 30.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. MPP GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 106.
122. SHATTERED REFUGE, supra note 108, at 35.
123. Id. at 21–22, 35. “Halting premature labor in a hospital setting and then releasing a
pregnant woman with a known risk for preeclampsia so that she can give birth in a tent in a makeshift
encampment next to a bridge on the Mexican side of the border clearly put the lives of both the mother
and baby at risk.” Id. at 22.
124. See U.S.: COVID-19 Policies Risk Asylum Seekers’ Lives, supra note 19.
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The global public health and economic crisis during the COVID-19
pandemic125 has intensified existing inequalities around the world. Immigrants
seeking refuge in the United States are no exception. On March 20, 2020, the United
States Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease
Control introduced new restrictions blocking entry to people who would “be
introduced into a congregate setting in a land Port of Entry (POE) or Border Patrol
station at or near the United States borders with Canada and Mexico.”126 The order
banning entry does not include U.S. citizens, U.S. legal permanent residents, or
citizens of countries in the U.S. visa waiver program, which are primarily in Europe
and Asia.127 By contrast, those included in the order are “aliens seeking to enter the
United States at POEs who do not have proper travel documents, aliens whose
entry is contrary to law, and aliens who are apprehended near the border seeking to
unlawfully enter the United States between POEs.”128 These categories include
almost all asylum seekers, based on the definition of, and process by which, people
can request asylum under U.S. law.129 As of January 2021, over 180,000 people were
turned away from the U.S. border on the basis of this order.130
A group of legal, faith-based, humanitarian, and community organizations
wrote to CBP requesting that those subject to the MPP be paroled into the United
States because of the difficulty of practicing physical distancing in their current
locations and the increased health and safety risks they face in light of the
pandemic.131 The letter highlights the fact that most Mexican migrant shelters are
125. In early March 2020, most U.S. states ordered their citizens to shelter in place to prevent
the spread of the COVID-19 virus. All nonessential activities were forbidden, and most businesses
shuttered. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., ORDER SUSPENDING INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN PERSONS FROM COUNTRIES
WHERE A COMMUNICABLE DISEASE EXISTS 1 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/pdf/CDCOrder-Prohibiting-Introduction-of-Persons_Final_3-20-20_3-p.pdf [ https://perma.cc/US2C-6AKJ ].
126. Id.
127. Frequently Asked Questions About the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/
travel/international-visitors/frequently-asked-questions-about-visa-waiver-program-vwp-and-electronicsystem-travel [ https://perma.cc/Z9EG-CZ89 ] (July 29, 2019).
128. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 125, at 2.
129. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).
130. Nationwide Enforcement Encounters: Title 8 Enforcement Actions and Title 42 Expulsions,
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics
/title-8-and-title-42-statistics [ https://perma.cc/LV5T-VK33 ] (Jan. 7, 2021).
131. Letter from Acción de Gracia Immigr. Assistance, Al Otro Lado, Angry Tias & Abuelas,
Border Kindness, Cath. Charities of S. New Mexico, Cath. Legal Immigr. Network, Inc. (CLINIC),
Centro Legal de la Raza, Diocesan Migrant & Refugee Servs., Inc., Esperanza Immigrant Rts. Project,
Every Last One, Familia: Trans Queer Liberation Movement, The Florence Immigrant & Refugee
Rts. Project, HIAS, HOPE Border Inst., Hum. Rts. First, Immigrant Defs. L. Ctr., Immigrant Legal
Def., Innovation L. Lab, Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración, AC (IMUMI), Jewish
Fam. Serv. of San Diego, Kino Border Initiative, Las Americas Immigrant Advoc. Ctr., Nat’l Immigrant
Just. Ctr., Physicians for Hum. Rts., Santa Fe Dreamers Project, Sisters of Mercy, Laredo, Texas
& Sueños Sin Fronteras de Tejas, to Chad F. Wolf, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Matthew
T. Albence, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Mark A. Morgan, Acting Comm’r,
U.S. Customs & Border Prot., and James McHenry, Dir., Exec. Off. of Immigr. Rev. 1 (Apr. 14, 2020)
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not accepting new arrivals due to the pandemic; therefore, many more asylum
seekers must gather in crowded, dirty, and dangerous encampments.132 At a
minimum, the coalition of organizations requested that CBP not require those
subject to the MPP “to repeatedly travel back and forth to ports [of entry] through
dangerous border areas during the COVID-19 outbreak.”133 A representative of
CBP responded to the letter but ignored the parole request and merely reiterated
the MPP hearing postponement schedule.134 The dangerous combination of these
orders has made it virtually impossible to apply for asylum in the United States
during the COVID-19 pandemic.135
Under the MPP, the United States government flagrantly disregards its legal
obligations to not return those seeking safety to a place in which they are in danger
and not to create situations of danger and humanitarian crisis at its border. The
international legal principle of nonrefoulement was developed to safeguard against
situations like this and thus forbids governments from flouting their legal and moral
obligations to offer a haven to those fleeing dangers in other nations.136 These
health and safety risks further complicate any attempt to secure legal representation
in preparation for a hearing in immigration court.
B. Obstructing Access to Counsel
Respondents in immigration court have a right to counsel but only at their
own expense.137 Securing a universal right to government-appointed legal
representation, or even a right for some classes of respondents, has been a subject
of debate and advocacy for years.138 Respondents with legal representation have a
[ hereinafter Letter from Acción de Gracia Immigration Assistance et al. ], https://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/LetterfromMPPServiceProvidersonCOVID19_U
pdate.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2RC-FY64 ].
132. Id. at 1–2.
133. Id. at 1.
134. Letter from James W. McCament, Senior Off. Performing the Duties of Under Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kennji Kizuka, Senior Researcher & Pol’y Analyst, Hum. Rts. First
(May 14, 2020), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/DHSResponsetoMPPLetter0
5.14.20.pdf [ https://perma.cc/383Y-VTTX ].
135. Bill Ong Hing, Trump Has Achieved His Goal of Abolishing Asylum, SLATE (Apr. 10, 2020,
11:33 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/04/trump-asylum-coronavirus.html [ https://
perma.cc/V7QV-SK2J ].
136. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 30, at 176.
137. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being represented, at
no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in
such proceedings.”).
138. See generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282 (2013) (explaining the
growth of a system combining civil immigration legal service providers with criminal defense lawyers
to try to fill the void in representation and evaluating alternative approaches to immigration defense
services). So far, only one court decision has recognized a right to government-appointed counsel for a
certain class of respondents. See Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1058
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that immigration judges must appoint counsel for detained, indigent
immigrants with serious mental impairments). In response to this decision, the government began a
new nationwide policy to provide appointed counsel. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of
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statistically much higher chance of securing favorable outcomes in their
immigration proceedings.139 Yet, even counting those who can afford to pay for
legal representation, only thirty-seven percent of all immigrants in the pre-MPP
system were represented by an attorney in their immigration proceedings.140
Prior to the MPP, families requesting asylum in the United States after
presenting at a port of entry or entering without inspection were almost always
either detained or paroled after their initial CBP processing.141 Accordingly, the
immigration legal service providers developed models to operate within this system.
While detained immigrants are certainly underserved, in most jurisdictions there are
some legal services in detention facilities and some attorneys who work almost
exclusively with detained clients.142
However, the vast majority of U.S. immigration legal service providers are ill
equipped to shift their practices to serve clients located in Mexico. Trying to
represent a client who is not physically present in the same vicinity, let alone the
same country, severely constrains an attorney’s time and financial resources. To
build an asylum case, an attorney must work directly with the client, discussing the
history of their life and their fear of persecution in great detail, as well as create a

Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce Safeguards for Unrepresented
Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/department-justice-and-department-homeland-security-announce-safeguardsunrepresented [ https://perma.cc/BM2S-8YAM ].
139. See JENNIFER STAVE, PETER MARKOWITZ, KAREN BERBERICH, TAMMY CHO, DANNY
DUBBANEH, LAURA SIMICH, NINA SIULC & NOELLE SMART, VERA INST. OF JUST., EVALUATION OF
THE NEW YORK IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY PROJECT: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
REPRESENTATION ON FAMILY AND COMMUNITY UNITY (2017), https://www.vera.org/downloads/
publications/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project-evaluation.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/D5XWANZD ]; see also Eagly & Shafer, supra note 4, at 9 (“[D]etained immigrants with counsel obtained a
successful outcome (i.e., case termination or relief) in 21% of cases, ten-and-a-half times greater than
the 2% rate for their pro se counterparts.”).
140. Id. at 7.
141. Innovation L. Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 2019); Nicole Narea, The
Demise of America’s Asylum System Under Trump, Explained, VOX (Nov. 5, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://
www.vox.com/2019/11/5/20947938/asylum-system-trump-demise-mexico-el-salvador-hondurasguatemala-immigration-court-border-ice-cbp
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20201117080745/
https://www.vox.com/2019/11/5/20947938/asylum-system-trump-demise-mexico-el-salvadorhonduras-guatemala-immigration-court-border-ice-cbp ].
142. See, e.g., Detained Adult Program, CAP. AREA IMMIGRANTS’ RTS. COAL., https://
www.caircoalition.org/what-we-do/detained-adult-program [ https://perma.cc/7YZP-U5KG ] ( last
visited Jan. 18, 2021 ) (noting this organization is the only one “in the Washington, D.C. area with a
legal services program focused exclusively on assisting detained immigrant men, women, and children”);
Community Education for Detained Adults, ESPERANZA IMMIGRANT RTS. PROJECT, https://
www.esperanza-la.org/programs-ce-detained-adults [ https://perma.cc/WFU5-H5C4 ] ( last visited
Jan. 18, 2021 ). Local government and philanthropic donors in New York City established the “New
York Immigrant Family Unity Project,” the first program of its kind in the United States to provide
universal representation to detained immigrants. See New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, BRONX
DEFS.,
https://www.bronxdefenders.org/programs/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project/
[ https://perma.cc/89GT-THHH ] ( last visited Jan. 18, 2021 ).
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record with any documents that the client has brought or can obtain.143 Most
nonprofit legal service providers cannot afford the extra time or expense for regular
trips to Mexico to meet with their clients and must attempt to build the case over
the phone.144 After waiting in Mexico for their hearing for two months, only
0.4% of people subject to the MPP had retained an attorney, compared with
18.1% for those who waited the same amount of time in the United States.145
Even relatively fortunate immigrants who have sought out help at
well-connected shelters or legal service organizations still struggle to secure legal
representation in their asylum cases.146 Access to counsel was already one of the
greatest factors that contributed to less fair and less equal immigration outcomes in
court.147 The MPP has severely exacerbated these existing inequalities by excluding
vulnerable asylum seekers from the legal infrastructure they need to successfully
present their claim for asylum in the United States.
C. Due Process Violations in Immigration Court
In theory, procedural due process applies to removal proceedings.148 The
immigration courts are housed within the executive branch, and immigration judges
are employees of the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration

143. See Letter from a coalition of organizations and academics to Jerrold Nadler, Chair of
House Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Reps., Bennie G. Thompson, Chair of House
Comm. on Homeland Sec., U.S. House of Reps., Jamie Raskin, Chair of House Subcomm. on
C.R. & C.L., U.S. House of Reps., Zoe Lofgren, Chair of House Judiciary Immigr. & Citizenship
Subcomm., U.S. House of Reps., and Kathleen Rice, Chair of House Subcomm. on Border Sec.,
Facilitation & Operations, U.S. House of Reps. 4 (Nov. 18, 2019) [ hereinafter Letter to Jerrold Nadler
et al. ], https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/commentary-item/documents/
2019-11/NGOs_and_academics_letter_to_Congress_to_End_Remain_in_Mexico-Nov_2019.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/7N3Y-5X5J ] (“[G]iven the complex legal standards and the trauma experienced by
asylum-seekers, meaningful representation requires many hours of client interviews and
preparation. . . . U.S.-based immigration attorneys hesitate to take cases if they cannot meet face-to-face
with their clients to discuss sensitive facts in their asylum cases.” (footnote omitted)).
144. Jack Herrera, Lawyers Struggle to Remotely Represent Asylum-Seekers in ‘Remain in Mexico’
Program, WORLD (Mar. 2, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-03-02/lawyersstruggle-remotely-represent-asylum-seekers-remain-mexico-program [ https://perma.cc/N7QL-4Y9X ].
145. Access to Attorneys Difficult for Those Required to Remain in Mexico, supra note 7.
146. A Mexican attorney who runs the legal clinic at Espacio Migrante, an immigrant shelter in
Tijuana, recounted her extreme difficulties in trying to find American immigration attorneys for MPP
clients who she says have been rendered “invisible” by the MPP policy. Telephone Interview with Tania
García Barajas, supra note 9.
147. Id.; Eagly & Shafer, supra note 4, at 9.
148. Yamataya v. Fisher (Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (“[T]his court
has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing
the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles
that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. One
of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time,
to be heard, before such officers, in respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends . . . .”).
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Review (EOIR).149 The statutory requirements of immigration court exist to ensure
immigrants have the opportunity to present evidence in support of their case,
cross-examine witnesses, receive a transcript of the proceedings, and be heard
before a judge who has a duty to develop the record.150 But the MPP has
significantly eroded the due process protections immigrants receive in court.
The critiques of expedited removal and other forms of summary removal do
not apply in the same way to MPP proceedings because those subject to the MPP
have the opportunity to present their claim for relief before an immigration judge.151
Yet, hearings for asylum applicants subject to the MPP still violate some of the most
basic protections of immigration court. According to data available as of November
2020, fewer than one percent of respondents in MPP immigration proceedings were
granted relief.152 This rate contrasts dramatically with the historic asylum grant rate
of about twenty percent.153 Such results can hardly be the product of a meaningful
and fair adjudicative process.
Most MPP cases are concentrated in immigration courts in border districts154
so respondents can be ferried from the port of entry to a nearby court.155 The huge
concentration of cases on border-jurisdiction dockets means proceedings have been
extremely backlogged.156 Immigration courts across the country have had
overloaded dockets for years,157 but the MPP has pushed older cases in border
jurisdictions farther back in line to prioritize the asylum cases of those subject to
the MPP.158 The President of the National Association of Immigration Judges,
149. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., STATISTICS YEARBOOK: FISCAL
YEAR 2018, at 4 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download [ https://
perma.cc/ZVP6-SE6Z ].
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)–(C), (1).
151. Compare Koh, Removal in Shadows, supra note 60, at 193, 198–99 (describing expansions in
the use of removals that bypass the immigration courts, namely expedited removal, reinstatement, and
administrative removal), with Nielsen Press Release, supra note 3 (outlining how MPP
proceedings operate).
152. Details on MPP (Remain in Mexico) Deportation Proceedings, supra note 21 (showing that
only 615 cases out of 69,333 were granted relief).
153. Gustavo Solis, Asylum Grant Rates Under Remain in Mexico Are Far Below Historic
Average, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Dec. 26, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
news/immigration/story/2019-12-26/asylum-grant-rates-under-remain-in-mexico-are-far-below-historicaverage [ https://perma.cc/58DA-VTG2 ].
154. Details on MPP (Remain in Mexico) Deportation Proceedings, supra note 21.
155. MPP GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 106 (“[Ports of entry] will coordinate with ICE
[Enforcement and Removal Operations] to establish transfer of custody and expeditious transportation
from the [port of entry] to the hearing.”).
156. Mica Rosenberg, Kristina Cooke & Reade Levinson, Hasty Rollout of Trump Immigration
Policy Has ‘Broken’ Border Courts, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2019, 3:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-immigration-courts-insight/hasty-rollout-of-trump-immigration-policy-has-broken-bordercourts-idUSKCN1VV115 [ https://perma.cc/X5AP-3ZSN ] (“39% of the backlog in the San Diego
court and 44% of the backlog in the El Paso court was due to MPP case loads [sic] . . . .”).
157. “At the end of FY2018, the backlog of open cases remaining to be processed was 319,302
. . . .” SHATTERED REFUGE, supra note 108, at 49.
158. Farida Jhabvala Romero, San Diego Judges Told to Speed Up Cases Under Controversial
Immigration Policy, KQED (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/11770865/san-diego-
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Judge Ashley Tabaddor, has been outspoken about the unprecedented pressure on
immigration judges at the southern border who are forced to cope with the MPP
cases added to their dockets.159 Immigration judges must now conduct initial
proceedings with dozens of MPP cases scheduled for the same time slot, allocating
only a few minutes to each case.160 Considering that receiving a grant of asylum
usually requires presenting evidence and examining witnesses, this truncated
timeline is wholly insufficient for applicants to make their cases.161
Requiring asylum applicants to check in for their hearings in the middle of the
night, make an exhausting journey across the border, wait for several hours, and
then spend only a few minutes presenting their case—usually without the benefit
of an attorney—severely undermines the fairness and efficiency of immigration
adjudication. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, it has gotten much worse. The
government postponed all MPP hearings for the duration of the COVID-19
pandemic, thus indefinitely stranding immigrants at the border who are already in
danger and without safe or sanitary living conditions.162
Another way the Trump administration addressed the new logistical challenges
that the MPP presents was to open “tent courts” in some Texas border towns,
including Laredo and Brownsville.163 These tent courts have “capacity” to hold as
many as 720 hearings per day.164 The immigrants and their attorneys, for the few
who have attorneys, appear in the tent courts in border cities, while the judges and
DHS attorneys appear by video conference from brick-and-mortar courts hundreds
of miles away.165 There is no clear policy as to the procedure these tent courts should
follow or who is responsible for their oversight.166 The tent courts have regularly
been closed to members of the public, including to translators, journalists, and other

judges-told-to-speed-up-cases-under-controversial-immigration-policy
[ https://perma.cc/KQQ69VA2 ]. “As of June 30, 2019, 430 immigration judges were [tasked with] more than 1.3 million active
and backlogged cases.” SHATTERED REFUGE, supra note 108, at 9.
159. Romero, supra note 158 ( “The judges are frankly experiencing very high levels of anxiety
and stress and frustration. They are working at rates that are unsustainable.”).
160. Id.
161. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
162. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Dep’t of Justice and Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Announce
Plan to Restart MPP Hearings (July 17, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justiceand-department-homeland-security-announce-plan-restart-mpp-hearings [ https://perma.cc/LZL5L4T5 ]. This plan requires several public health criteria to be met in border states in both the U.S. and
Mexico, as well as globally, before MPP hearings will resume.
163. Nicole Narea, House Democrats Say Migrants Aren’t Getting Fair Hearings in Tent Courts
on the Border, VOX (Oct. 18, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/10/
18/20920000/house-democrats-investigation-tent-courts-border-port [ https://web.archive.org/web/
20201125025315/https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/10/18/20920000/house-democratsinvestigation-tent-courts-border-port ].
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also Koh, Removal in Shadows, supra note 60, at 225 (noting that scholars and
advocates have long disparaged the ways that videoconferencing in immigration court procedures
“leads to immigrants’ decreased engagement with the legal process”).
166. See Narea, supra note 163.
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advocates.167 Holding immigration court without the due process protections
required in these kinds of proceedings erodes any aspiration for a meaningful
immigration court process.
The multifaceted impact of the MPP makes it particularly fatal to the efficacy
and fairness of the U.S. asylum system. The policy contradicts the purpose of asylum
as a system that allows people in danger to seek refuge by increasing the risk of
refoulement. The MPP has also prevented those in the asylum system from
connecting to legal advocates and social networks that are essential to navigating
the byzantine U.S. asylum application process.168 Finally, the implementation of the
MPP has reduced the capacity of the immigration legal process by overloading the
asylum dockets and pushing these proceedings even farther out of the public eye.169
For many families, seeking refuge in the United States is their last hope for survival
after escaping dangers in their countries of origin. But the implementation of the
MPP has largely extinguished this hope for thousands fleeing to U.S. borders from
across the globe.
The effect of the MPP is even more severe because the timeline of its
implementation has coincided with so many other policies restricting asylum.170
This trend raises alarm about the unbridled power of the executive branch to
remake our immigration legal system.171 Advocates, scholars, and legislators
rightfully consider this amalgamation of policies as a coordinated, large-scale attack
on the asylum pillar of the U.S. immigration legal system.172
III. CHALLENGES TO THE MPP
In light of the devastating impact of the MPP, immigrants, advocates, and
service providers immediately made legal and nonlegal challenges to its
implementation. This Part discusses the challenges to the policy, including the
primary case enjoining the entire MPP, as well as other cases that have challenged
component procedures, like access to counsel during the nonrefoulement interview.

167. Id. (“Officials have since allowed translators into the hearing rooms, . . . but neither DHS
nor the DOJ have issued any formal clarification of their policy.”); see also Rekha Sharma-Crawford,
Justice Denied: My Journey Inside the Secret Tent Courts Where Refugees Are Being Denied Dignity and
Due Process, 89 J. KAN. BAR ASS’N, Feb. 2020, at 6, 6–7 (stating that access to the tent “‘courthouse’ is
inaccessible except to the limited few” and how attorneys and their migrant clients are escorted
everywhere they go).
168. See Letter to Jerrold Nadler et al., supra note 143, at 4.
169. See Romero, supra note 158; Narea, supra note 163.
170. SHATTERED REFUGE, supra note 108, at 4–5.
171. See Marouf, supra note 89, at 760–76 (discussing metering, the criminal prosecution of
asylum seekers, and family separation practices as executive branch strategies for preventing
immigration adjudication).
172. Id. at 785; SHATTERED REFUGE, supra note 108, at 3; Isaac Chotiner, How the Trump
Administration Uses the “Hidden Weapons” of Immigration Law, NEW YORKER (Feb. 13, 2020), https:/
/www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/how-the-trump-administration-uses-the-hidden-weapons-ofimmigration-law [ https://perma.cc/FD7U-US9C ].
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A. Legislative and Grassroots Challenges
While the MPP has not garnered the media buzz of some of former President
Trump’s other immigration policies,173 public pressure to end the MPP has been
mounting as awareness about its horrific impact on asylum seekers grows. In
February 2019, the American Immigration Lawyers Association submitted a letter
demanding an end to the MPP,174 and a coalition of immigration, human rights, and
civil rights organizations and academics wrote to Congress in November 2019 with
the same request.175 Former Senator and Vice President Kamala Harris (D-CA) and
Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), signed on to a letter demanding that DHS
release the results of an internal report conducted to assess the efficacy and impact
of the MPP.176 On January 14, 2020, the House Committee on the Judiciary opened
a formal investigation into the MPP and requested extensive documentation from
DHS about the impact of the policy.177 Yet, these efforts have not significantly
affected the implementation of the policy.
Some of the most valuable resources in the fight against the MPP have been
provided by those documenting the abuses the policy has precipitated, including
tracking how many individuals are subject to the MPP, how their court cases
proceed, and how their lives unfold at the border.178 The other unsung heroes are
the grassroots, community organizations based in border communities who
overcome tremendous obstacles every day to offer food, shelter, healthcare, and
legal services to vulnerable immigrants subject to the MPP.179 These advocates,

173. Narea, supra note 141 (“[C]hanges [like the MPP] have been made quietly and have never
been able to inspire the kind of public outrage sparked by Trump’s travel ban in January 2017 . . . or
the outrage toward the ‘zero tolerance’ policy that led to family separation in spring 2018.”).
174. Letter from The Am. Immigr. Council, The Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n, and the Cath. Legal
Immigr. Network, Inc., to Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 6, 2019)
[ hereinafter Letter to Kirstjen M. Nielsen ], https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-correspondence/
2019/aila-and-advocates-send-letter-urging-secretary [ https://perma.cc/JT26-35LF ].
175. Letter to Jerrold Nadler et al., supra note 143, at 1, 5.
176. Letter from Jeffrey A. Merkley, Charles E. Schumer, Kamala D. Harris, and Elizabeth
Warren, U.S. Sens., to Chad Wolf, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Nov. 19, 2019), https:/
/www.merkley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/19.11.19%20DHS%20MPP%20Report%20Request%20
Letter.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4RD9-MK3M ].
177. Letter from Jerrold Nadler, Chairman of House Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Reps., Zoe Lofgren, Chair of Subcomm. on Immigr. & Citizenship, U.S. House of Reps., Pramila
Jayapal, Vice Chair of Subcomm. on Immigr. & Citizenship, U.S. House of Reps., J. Luis Correa,
U.S. House of Reps., Sylvia R. Garcia, U.S. House of Reps., Joe Neguse, U.S. House of Reps., Debbie
Mucarsel-Powell, U.S. House of Reps., and Veronica Escobar, U.S. House of Reps., to Chad Wolf,
Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. ( Jan. 14, 2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
judiciary_objections_to_mpp.pdf?utm_campaign=349-519 [ https://perma.cc/6XPX-Q9SZ ].
178. See, e.g., Details on MPP (Remain in Mexico) Deportation Proceedings, supra note 21.
179. While this Note began with a vignette from the author’s experience volunteering with Al
Otro Lado, it is certainly not the only organization delivering essential services to immigrants and border
communities affected by the MPP. See Border Advocacy Groups, NAT’L NETWORK FOR IMMIGRANT
& REFUGEE RTS., https://www.nnirr.org/drupal/border-groups [ https://perma.cc/5SDH-C2SF ]
( last visited Jan. 18, 2021 ) (listing groups active along the U.S.-Mexico border offering free legal
services, education, healthcare, shelter, food, and more); see also Letter from Acción de Gracia
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social workers, healthcare workers, organizers, and students challenge the MPP by
enabling more asylum seekers to reach the United States. Their work has equipped
families subject to the MPP with more resources and tools to survive these
harrowing proceedings and find refuge in the United States. While the resilience
and determination of immigrants and their tireless advocates has been the backbone
of this movement, the earliest victories against the MPP came through the courts.
B. Legal Challenges
Immigrants’ rights and civil rights groups immediately sued the government
demanding termination of the MPP. On February 14, 2019, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) filed Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, arguing that the MPP
deprives affected individuals of a meaningful opportunity to apply for asylum and
that the process for assessing who is subject to the policy is insufficient.180 The
district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, granting a preliminary injunction to
stop implementation of the MPP.181 However, the Ninth Circuit granted a stay of
the injunction pending their consideration of the merits of the case.182
While the Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf case was pending on appeal, the ACLU
of San Diego and Imperial Counties filed a separate lawsuit contesting a narrower
issue of the MPP: that those subject to the policy have been denied access to their
already retained counsel with regard to preparation for and representation during
the nonrefoulement interview.183 In January 2020, a district court granted class-wide
injunctive relief requiring DHS to allow those subject to the MPP to meet with
retained counsel in private before the nonrefoulement interview and for the
attorney to be present during the interview.184 The San Diego court found sections
555(b) and 559 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) authorized the
presence of an attorney before and during such interviews; failure to access that
attorney would result in irreparable harm to the plaintiffs.185 The court further noted
that “[g]iven the stakes of a non-refoulement interview—the return to a country in
which one may face persecution and torture—and the interview’s fact-intensive
nature, it is undeniable that access to counsel is important.”186 This legal victory
added a significant safeguard in the MPP process but still only applies to a small
subset of asylum applicants—those with retained counsel.

Immigration Assistance et al., supra note 131, at 3 (noting signatories are community organizations
working on the border).
180. Complaint at 2, Innovation L. Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(No. 3:19-cv-00807-RS).
181. Innovation L. Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d sub
nom. Innovation L. Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.), and cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 617 (2020).
182. Innovation L. Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 2019).
183. Doe v. Wolf, 432 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1203–04 (S.D. Cal. 2020).
184. Id. at 1204.
185. Id. at 1212–13; 5 U.S.C. § 555(b).
186. Doe, 432 F. Supp. 3d at 1213.
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On February 28, 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in
Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, enjoining the MPP policy overall.187 Judge William
A. Fletcher authored the appellate panel’s decision and cited to his concurrence
from the earlier decision granting the government’s motion to stay the preliminary
injunction stating, “I am hopeful that the regular argument panel that will ultimately
hear the appeal . . . will be able to see the Government’s arguments for what they
are—baseless arguments in support of an illegal policy[.]”188 The court held that
those subject to the MPP fall under section 1225(b)(1) of the United States Code
and therefore cannot be subjected to the contiguous territory return provision that
only applies to those who qualify as “other aliens” under section 1225(b)(2).189 On
these grounds, the court held that the MPP was invalid because the government’s
interpretation of section 1225(b), which the government cited as the statutory
authority for the MPP, is an interpretation inconsistent with the statute itself.190
The court also ruled on one of the plaintiffs’ alternative arguments, holding
the MPP is invalid in part because it violates the United States’s nonrefoulement
obligations in section 1231(b)(3)(A) of the United States Code.191 The court held
that Congress intended section 1231(b)(3)(A) as “a general anti-refoulement
provision, applicable whenever an alien might be returned to a country where his or
her life or freedom might be threatened on account of a protected ground.”192 The
court dedicated several pages of its opinion to quotations from plaintiff declarations
detailing dangerous experiences and fears of persecution as support for its holding
that requiring asylum seekers to affirmatively assert their fear of returning to Mexico
is a legally insufficient safeguard against refoulement.193 The court further cited to
amicus briefs from human rights advocacy organizations documenting the dangers
faced by asylum seekers subject to the MPP.194 The court also referenced the amicus
brief written by the union of asylum officers, which stated that asylum officers
operating under the MPP “face a conflict between the directives of their
departmental leaders to follow the MPP and adherence to our Nation’s legal
commitment to not returning the persecuted to a territory where they will face
persecution.”195 Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiffs had also shown a
likelihood of success on their claim that the MPP does not comply with
nonrefoulement obligations under section 1231(b).196
187. Innovation L. Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 617 (2020).
188. Id. at 1080 (quoting Innovation L. Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 518 (9th Cir. 2019)
(Fletcher, J., concurring)) (alteration in original).
189. Id. at 1083–84, 1087 (“The structure of § (b)(1), which contains detailed provisions for
processing asylum seekers, demonstrates that Congress recognized that § (b)(1) applicants may have
valid asylum claims and should therefore receive the procedures specified in § (b)(1).”).
190. Id. at 1084, 1087.
191. Id. at 1087, 1093.
192. Id. at 1089.
193. Id. at 1090–92.
194. Id. at 1092–93.
195. Id. at 1093.
196. Id.
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In response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the government immediately filed
a motion to stay the preliminary injunction.197 The court denied the motion to stay
with respect to ports of entry in California and Arizona but granted the motion
along the rest of the border due to jurisdictional concerns about the scope of the
injunction.198 The Ninth Circuit also granted the government’s request that,
notwithstanding the decision on the merits, the court extend the previous stay for
one week until the Supreme Court could decide whether to intervene.199 The
Supreme Court did intervene, and, on March 11, 2020, granted an emergency stay
of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, permitting the government to continue its
implementation of the MPP until the Justices decided whether to hear the case.200
On April 9, 2020, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
requesting that the Supreme Court reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Innovation
Law Lab v. Wolf.201 Although the Supreme Court did agree to hear the case, the
Biden administration intervened before oral argument and the Justices granted the
new administration’s petition to remove the case from the argument calendar.202
This was a significant step to eliminate the risk that a Supreme Court ruling may set
precedent permitting future presidential administrations to revive the MPP.
CONCLUSION
On January 20, 2021, almost exactly two years after the initial implementation
of the MPP, the Biden administration announced it would “cease adding individuals
into the program.”203 Yet this announcement left open the question of when and
how the thousands of people still waiting in Mexico will be admitted to the United
States.204 Since March 2020, DHS had largely stopped subjecting immigrants to the
MPP and refused to process new applicants, citing the ongoing public health
emergency.205 But the COVID-19 pandemic has severely exacerbated risks to health
and safety for those languishing in border camps and already subject to the MPP.206
197. Innovation L. Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 2020).
198. Id. at 990.
199. Id. at 991.
200. Wolf v. Innovation L. Lab, 140 S. Ct. 1564 (2020) (granting temporary stay of
preliminary injunction).
201. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Wolf v. Innovation L. Lab, No. 19-01212
(U.S. Apr. 10, 2020).
202. See Order List: 592 U.S. (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders
/020321zr_6jfl.pdf [ https://perma.cc/3WS2-PS42 ].
203. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Statement on the Suspension
of New Enrollments in the Migrant Protection Protocols Program (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/01/20/dhs-statement-suspension-new-enrollments-migrantprotection-protocols-program [ https://perma.cc/XEY4-RLN3 ].
204. Id.
205. Brief in Opposition at 1, Wolf v. Innovation L. Lab, No. 19-1212 (Apr. 10, 2020) (“The
order, which is intended to remain in effect for as long as the public health concerns raised by
COVID-19 persist, renders [the] MPP effectively superfluous as a border enforcement tool, and the
government has largely abandoned its use of the processing of new arrivals.”).
206. Letter from Acción de Gracia Immigration Assistance et al., supra note 131, at 1–2.
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The MPP has created a humanitarian crisis at the U.S.-Mexico border and a
logistical and procedural nightmare in the U.S. immigration court system. The
impact of the other asylum policies discussed in this Note mean that asylum seekers’
current chances of success in immigration court, even if they can wait in the United
States, are still very slim.207 The border immigration courts whose dockets were
already overloaded, and are doubly burdened by the inundation of MPP cases, will
likely take years to recover from this extreme backlog.208 The immigrant families
whose children have endured malnutrition, disease, and the trauma of violence and
persecution while they wait in Mexico may never be the same.209 The reality of
reversing policies like the MPP is likely to be far more challenging than the way it is
described in campaign promises. Those committed to immigrant justice and the
integrity of the immigration legal system must chart a new way forward.
This Note invites future discussion about the potential for creative and
courageous advocacy in the courts, legislature, and at the Unites States-Mexico
border in opposition to this and many other policies restricting access to asylum.210
The legacy of the MPP in an era of deteriorating asylum protections demands
greater government accountability for past and ongoing harms as well as a national
reckoning with the political conditions that led us here.

207. Julia Preston, ‘Wreckage Everywhere’: Can Biden Undo Trump’s Harsh Immigration Policies?,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/nov/
23/can-biden-undo-trumps-harsh-immigration-policies [ https://perma.cc/7UT2-BAVV ] (“During
the coronavirus pandemic, [the MPP] program has stalled. But once those cases start moving in the
courts, under the current asylum standards many are doomed to fail and end in deportation orders.”).
208. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 156.
209. Bochenek, supra note 8 (“The conditions, threats to safety, and sense of uncertainty asylum
seekers face while waiting in Mexico creates chronic and severe psychological stress for children and
families . . . . We know that these forms of pervasive, unresolved complex trauma can lead to significant
long-term negative consequences for child development and family functioning.”); see also Letter to
Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 174 (providing first-hand accounts of the violence that families subject
to the MPP experience).
210. See generally Stephen Manning & Juliet Stumpf, Big Immigration Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 407 (2018) (describing the use of technology to offer representation despite limitations in
geography and the availability of lawyers in the immediate vicinity).
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